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"May every soul be subdued to higher powers, because whoever resists the powerful, resists God's rules, and whoever does this, is eternally condemned." -Alonso de Vega (1598, p. 1030) 1 
Introduction
Everyone has heard of a kangaroo court. But how about a court for kangaroos? What about one for caterpillars? Impossible though it seems, for 250 years French, Italian, and Swiss legal systems had just that. Their ecclesiastic courts tried insects and rodents for property crimes as legal persons under the same laws and according to the same procedures they used to try actual persons. These courts summonsed snails to answer charges of trespass, appointed locusts legal counselors, and considered defenses for grasshoppers on the grounds that they were God's creatures. They convicted cockcha¤ers of cozening crops, fulminated against …eldmice for …lching farmers, and exiled weevils under pain of excommunication and anathema.
Vermin trials weren't the province of Dark Age ignorance or impoverished primitivism.
They were a much later, more enlightened vintage-a Renaissance one. Further, they occurred in the wealthiest countries in the world.
One interpretation of vermin trials is that the judicial o¢ cials who conducted them were mad. Examining these trials' records, it's tempting to conclude as much. In them we …nd distinguished judges ordering crickets to follow legal instructions, digni…ed jurists negotiating a settlement between farmers and beetles, and a decorous court granting a horde of rat defendants a continuance on the grounds that some cats prevented them from attending their trial.
One gets the sense from these records that history is playing a bizarre joke on him, or that perhaps Alice's Wonderland was a real place after all. But history isn't playing a joke. And while Wonderland's talking, pipe-pu¢ ng caterpillar is …ctitious, legal systems that treated caterpillars like they could talk and might occasionally enjoy a good pipe are very real.
Vermin trials pose a peculiar puzzle. As one scholar described that puzzle, "nobody knows what they were for, and nobody has ever known" (Ewald 1995 (Ewald , p. 1925 vermin trials were for, uncovering their raison d'être would seem to defy penetration by rational choice. This paper solves the peculiar puzzle vermin trials pose. To do so it uses the theory of rational choice. My analysis puts sense in the seeming senselessness of trying vermin for behaviors over which neither they nor legal systems have control. It uncovers why judges used excommunication and anathema to punish creatures that were never communicated in the …rst place. It sheds light on vermin trials'unusual geographic distribution, focused in eastern France and bordering regions of northern Italy and western Switzerland. And it illuminates the surprisingly late burst of these trials'usage in European history.
I argue that the Catholic Church used vermin trials to increase tithe revenues where tithe evasion threatened to erode them. Vermin trials achieved this by bolstering citizens'belief in the validity of Church punishments for tithe evasion: estrangement from God through sin, excommunication, and anathema.
Vermin trials permitted ecclesiastics to evidence their supernatural sanctions'legitimacy by producing outcomes that supported those sanctions' validity. Insects and rodents are itinerant. Moreover, they may be driven away or killed by predators, or ‡ee or die naturally for other unobserved reasons. Vermin that departed under courts'imprecations evidenced ecclesiastics'power to use the same imprecations to punish tithe evaders. Such trial outcomes strengthened citizens' belief that the Church's supernatural sanctions were real, allowing ecclesiastics to reclaim jeopardized tithe revenue.
My theory of vermin trials applies Kamenica and Gentzkow's (2011) theory of Bayesian persuasion. Kamenica and Gentzkow demonstrate how, by choosing how much information to reveal about the state of the world, one person can persuade another to take an action he would prefer over the action the target of his persuasion originally planned to take. This is true even though both persons are rational Bayesians and even though the target of persuasion knows the persuader makes his choice of how much information to reveal with the goal of manipulating the target's behavior for his own bene…t.
In the context I consider, ecclesiastic courts aim to persuade citizens that the Church can supernaturally punish tithe evaders. By choosing vermin trials'durations, courts choose how much information about the legitimacy of ecclesiastics'supernatural sanctions to convey to citizens. The probability that pests will ‡ee or die naturally rises as time passes. So shorter trials reveal more information about the validity of ecclesiastics'supernatural sanctions and longer trials reveal less. A shorter trial therefore increases citizens'belief more if it produces the outcome ecclesiastics want: vermin's departure. But precisely because it's shorter, such a trial is more likely to produce the outcome ecclesiastics don't want: vermin's persistence.
Courts'optimal trial duration negotiates this tradeo¤ to induce a distribution of beliefs that leads citizens who would otherwise evade their tithes to pay them instead.
Economists have said nothing about vermin trials. 2 
Damned Vermin
The golden age of vermin trials was the 15th through 17th centuries. 3 During this era citizens that confronted pest-control problems used class action lawsuits to sue vermin in ecclesiastic courts. These courts conducted vermin trials under bishops'authority and jurisdiction. A community of distressed citizens was the plainti¤. A species of insect or rodent was the defendant.
Vermin trials were based on an early modern superstition. According to that superstition, if ecclesiastics'invoked the appropriate conjurations against vermin pestering people without God's permission, God would thwart the pests supernaturally.
Early modern citizens'knowledge of pests and how to control them was poor. A perusal of "pest-control manuals" that professional farmers relied on for this purpose reveals just how poor. State of the art Renaissance pesticides included sprinkling weasel ashes or water in which a cat was bathed over …elds to drive away mice; capturing a rodent, castrating it, and releasing it among others to deter them; putting castor-oil plants in a-icted …elds to drive away moles; and hanging garlic around ‡ock leaders'necks to protect sheep from wolves. 4 These pest-control remedies were handed down from classical authorities. As one historian of agriculture put it, "Apparently the man of the Renaissance was all too ready to accept without question and to recommend to others the remedies he found in the classical authors . . . There is little mention of experimentation" (Dannenfeldt 1982, p. 558) . Because of this, early modern farmers'pest knowledge was barely better than the ancients'.
It's therefore unsurprising that, together with the other impressive remedies noted above, early modern farmers considered the ecclesiastical trial of vermin as a possible pesticide. Indeed, early modern pest-control manuals explicitly advised farmers to use "divine pesticide"
when they confronted di¢ cult infestations. As one manual put it, "When all of these reme-dies are unsuccessful, one must turn to the ban of the Church" (Dannenfeldt 1982 , p. 555).
Early modern citizens'divine-pesticide superstition is still less surprising when one considers the superstitions that Europe's intellectual elite held during the same period. These individuals held, for example, that the continent was infested by witches who had intercourse with demons and stole men's genitals in their sleep. Next to this belief, simple farmers'belief that God might be able to exterminate pests is unremarkable.
Citizens prosecuted vermin for violating their property rights. They sued insects and rodents for eating their crops, burrowing holes in their farmland, and trespassing on their property. For example, in the 16th century the inhabitants of Autun, France charged some rats with "having feloniously eaten up and wantonly destroyed the barley-crop of that province" (Evans 1906, p. 18) . Similarly, in 1478 the inhabitants of Berne, Switzerland sued some "ingers"-a species of beetle-for "creeping secretly in the earth devastat[ing] the …elds, meadows and all other kinds of grain" (Evans 1906 , p. 117). Gentlemen, these poor people on their knees and with tearful eyes, appeal to your sense of justice . . . In the power of excommunication you have a weapon more e¤ective than any wielded by that emperor [Augustus Caesar] to save these poor supplicants from impending famine produced by the ravages of little beasts, which spare neither the corn nor the vines . . . . It remains, therefore, after complying with the usual forms, only to adjudicate upon the case in accordance with the facts stated in the Petition of the Plainti¤s, which is right and reasonable, and, to this e¤ect, to enjoin these animals from continuing their devastations, ordering them to quit the aforesaid …elds and to withdraw to the place assigned them, pronouncing the necessary anathemas and execrations proscribed by our Holy Mother, the Church, for which your petitioners do ever pray.
If the court saw merit in the plainti¤s' petition, it might exhort the plainti¤s to pray publicly for the vermin to depart, hold processions for this purpose, and direct the plainti¤s to display extra-religiosity and repent of their sins. If the pests remained, the court might try them to determine their guilt. Alternatively, the court dispensed with the pious prelude and tried the vermin immediately.
Ecclesiastic courts appointed accused insects and rodents defense attorneys to represent them. Thus when in 1519 the inhabitants of Glurns, Italy sued some …eldmice for property damage, the court appointed the mice legal counsel "to the end that they may have nothing to complain of in these proceedings" (Evans 1906, p. 112) . Similarly, later that century when the inhabitants of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, France sued some weevils, the court appointed the creatures two legal representatives, a procurator and an advocate, "lest the animals against whom the action lies should remain defenseless" (Cohen 1993 , p. 120).
Ecclesiastic judges showed impressive fairness toward vermin in such trials. Consider a 14th-century century lawsuit the inhabitants of Mainz, Germany brought against some ‡ies. To the court's consternation the ‡ies refused to appear before the bench after being summonsed. The court concluded that "in consideration of their small size and the fact that they had not yet reached their majority," it would overlook the ‡ies'failure to appear and appoint them adequate defense counsel to prevent it from happening again (Evans 1906 , pp.
110-11).
Some court-appointed vermin defense counselors were more than adequate. Having taken such pains, the court made its judgment. Usually this was to convict the vermin. 7 Though occasionally vermin were exonerated, or at least weren't convicted, which amounted to the same (see, for instance, Evans 1906, pp. 38-39) .
To ensure that all members of the convicted species were aware of their sentence, the court announced its verdict publicly and nailed broadsheets declaring its judgment to trees in the a¤ected area. Alternatively, the court might bring some specimens before the bench to inform them of its decision, remitting the creatures to the a-icted area to share the decision with their colleagues (Dinzelbacher 2002 , p. 410).
The court also noti…ed the convicted pests of the penalty they would su¤er should they prove contumacious: excommunication from the Holy Church and anathema. Consider the 6 According to a book Chassenée published in 1531, another legal manuever vermin attorneys could resort to was to argue that their clients were clerics, entitling the vermin to the bene…t of clergy. This would have permitted insects and rodents to have an ecclesiastic judge decide their case when the bishop granted jurisdiction to a secular magistrate (Evans 1906, pp. 32-33) . No vermin counselor ever used this argument. Still, the possibility that caterpillars or …eldmice might be men of the cloth was an argument the courts were willing to entertain. 7 Often vermin lost their case by default. Judges summonsed vermin to appear in court to answer the charges against them three times. "The summonses were . . . served in the usual way by an o¢ cer of the court, reading them at the places most frequented by the animals" (Jamieson 1988, p. 51) . If the vermin failed to respond the third time, the court could convict them. court's decision in "The People versus Locusts" (Evans 1906 , p. 107):
In the name and by virtue of God, the omnipotent, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and of Mary, the most blessed Mother of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the authority of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, as well as by that which has made us functionary in this case, we admonish by these presents the aforesaid locusts and grasshopper and other animals by whatsoever name they may be called, under pain of malediction and anathema to depart from the vineyards and …elds of this district within six days from the publication of this sentence and to do no further damage there or elsewhere.
Vermin trials ended ironically. Pests damned …guratively by beleaguered plainti¤s were damned literally by courts of law.
3 Dîmes and Divine Punishment
Tithe Evasion
La dîme ecclesiastique-the ecclesiastic tithe-was the Church's "tax" on citizens. In principle citizens owed tithes on all agricultural output, livestock, and the proceeds of …shing, hunting, and trade. In practice churchmen demanded tithes on crops and livestock. These tithes were a central source of Church revenue in the early modern era. According to one estimate, they constituted two-thirds of that revenue on the eve of the French Revolution (Scott 1987, p. 439 ).
The Church assessed tithes "on the natural yield"-i.e., as a percentage of physical produce. A levy of about 10 percent was typical (Le Roy Ladurie and Goy 1982, p. 15).
Ecclesiastics collected tithes directly or leased the right to collect them to "tithe farmers" who paid their lessors cash for the privilege up front.
Enforcing tithe payments was di¢ cult. Government recognized the Church's right to collect them. And churchmen could, and sometimes did, use the state's coercive power to enforce tithe payment. But state enforcement had limited usefulness. It was most useful for preventing blatant refusal to pay. Tithe refusal was easy to detect and thus prosecute. In contrast, state enforcement was often useless for preventing surreptitious, partial underpayment. Tithe evasion was extremely hard, and in many cases impossible, to detect and thus prosecute.
Citizens developed "1,001 ruses"to evade their tithes (Le Roy Ladurie and Goy 1982, p.
27 ; Scott 1987, pp. 444-46) . Some of these ruses were simple. For example, citizens opened new plots and didn't declare them. Similarly, they hid portions of their harvests from tithe collectors before collectors came to assess them.
A more elaborate ruse was "crop switching."Producers substituted sewing crops tithable at higher rates with crops tithable at a lower rates or ones that weren't tithable at all. Alternatively, they interplanted higher-and lower-(or non-) tithable crops in the same …eld.
If planted cleverly, this permitted producers to pay a lower rate on the entire …eld.
Citizens also exploited loopholes in the tithe system. Personal gardens were often tithe exempt. So citizens expanded their gardens' size. Similarly, the sheaves that formed the bases of crop stacks were customarily non-tithable. So producers enlarged their stack bases too. 8 Natural variation in agricultural output from plot to plot, laborer to laborer, and so on, facilitated even the coarsest of evasive strategies tremendously. It thwarted tithe collectors' ability to discern whether the small harvest a citizen "declared" re ‡ected a genuinely poor crop or tithe evasion.
Tithe collectors did their best to monitor harvests and prevent such abuses. And they weren't totally clueless. They had an idea about what the weather was like that year and what a certain-sized plot was capable of producing. This helped collectors develop lowerbound estimates of tithable harvests for individual plots even if they couldn't determine the actual tithable harvests they confronted in particular cases. Still, the fact that the Church levied la dîme ecclesiastique on products whose nature was so amenable to producer dissimilation and manipulation "presented almost insurmountable obstacles to tithe collectors, who had only so many carts, so many assistants, and so much time" (Scott 1987 , pp. 444-45).
Supernatural Sanctions
Insurmountable obstacles to enforcing tithe compliance through external monitoring and detection required the Church to …nd a way to make tithe compliance self-enforcing. That way was supernatural sanction. Unlike traditional sanctions, supernatural ones execute "automatically." God's omniscience and omnipotence ensure perfect monitoring and detection of proscribed behaviors.
The Church supernaturally sanctioned persons who de…ed its orders by claiming to estrange them from God. Divine estrangement lay on a spectrum. At one end was the simple sinner. In violating its orders, the Church claimed a person sinned, distancing himself from the Lord. Unabsolved sin subtracted from the sinner's time with God in the afterlife and added to his time in purgatory.
At the other end of the estrangement from God spectrum was the excommunicant. In excommunicating someone, a Church o¢ cial separated that person from God and His Churchthe ordinary channel to salvation. Excommunication had three degrees of severity: minor, major, and anathema. A minor excommunication severed the excommunicant from the sacraments. A major excommunication severed him from God and the Church completely.
Anathema was a kind of aggravated major excommunication-a major excommunication with gusto. It involved a dramatic ceremony, cursing the excommunicant, and making the delivery of his soul to Satan explicit.
The Church could level its supernatural sanctions at particular individuals, whole communities (interdiction), or generically against all persons who engaged in particular proscribed behaviors. For example, heretics became excommunicants when they took up heretical thinking whether the Church identi…ed them individually as heretics or not. Such "excommunication latae sententiae"excommunicated o¤enders "in the act."Formal proclamations of excommunication or anathema that might follow merely recognized the o¤enders'pre-existing spiritual state publicly.
sanctions to enforce tithe payments through internal pressures. 10 It declared tithe evasion a sin-going as far as to include citizens'moral obligation to pay their tithes in the Church commandments (Villien 1915, pp. 348-49) . And it reminded citizens that tithe evasion was sinful incessantly (Jackson 1911, p. 454 ).
Ecclesiastics maximized the sin accomplished in evading tithes by rendering the obligation to tithe not merely an obligation to God's Church, but an obligation to God. As 12th-century pope Alexander III put it, tithes were "instituted not by men, but by God Himself"(Lansdell
1906, p. 191). A century later the Fourth Lateran Council rea¢ rmed this position. "[T]he
Lord," the Council decreed, "has reserved tithes unto himself as a sign of his universal lordship." They "are indeed to be paid of necessity, inasmuch as they are owed in virtue of divine law."Thus to evade tithes was to steal from God.
Ecclesiastics also used excommunication and anathema to enforce tithe compliance (Baumgartner 1995, p. 35). They pounded the pulpit excommunicating and cursing generaliter all tithe evaders in their parishes. They excommunicated tithe evaders latae sententiae in synods and provincial councils (Tausiet 2003, p. 441 ). And at the Council of Trent they prescribed excommunication for persons who didn't pay their tithes in full:
[W]hereas the payment of tithes is due to God; and they who refuse to pay them, or hinder those who give them, usurp the property of another. Wherefore, the holy Synod enjoins on all . . . that they henceforth pay in full the tithes, to which they are bound in law, to the cathedral church . . . And they who either withhold them, or hinder them (from being paid), shall be excommunicated. 11 Citizens could evade their tithes. But they could only do so under the pain of churchly imprecations that estranged them from God. 10 In some times and places in the early modern period the traditional tithe collected on agricultural output wasn't important or didn't exist. In these cases ecclesiastics relied on the "sacramental tithe"to earn revenue: charging for Easter communion, baptism, funerals, and so on (Torre 1992, p. 54). Of course, weak believers, who were less likely to seek such sacraments, were less likely to pay these tithes as well. Thus, here too, bolstering belief in ecclesiastics'supernatural sanctions was important for collecting revenue. 11 Excommunicating tithe evaders went back centuries before the Council of Trent. See, for instance, the Council of Mâcon in 585 and the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.
A Theory of Vermin Trials
The Church's supernatural sanctions had the potential to prevent tithe evasion. But there was a problem: people had to repose su¢ cient belief in those sanctions for them to work.
Ecclesiastics therefore sought a way to bolster citizens' belief in their divine punishments where citizens'belief in them was weakened. That way was vermin trials.
The ecclesiastics who administered vermin trials connected the pest infestations citizens asked them to assist with to citizens' tithe compliance directly. Vermin trials not only punished convicted pests with the same supernatural punishments ecclesiastics threatened against tithe evaders. The courts that conducted them used the trials to exhort citizens to pay their tithes in full explicitly. It's likely that tithing wasn't the only behavior ecclesiastics sought to in ‡uence through vermin trials. But given tithe revenue's importance to Church income, it's unsurprising that tithe compliance in particular featured prominently and explicitly in these trials. Further, unlike some other behaviors the Church may have desired to in ‡uence by manipulating citizens' belief, which were observable, tithe compliance was not. Tithing behavior therefore depended more strongly on citizens'belief in the validity of ecclesiastics'supernatural sanc-tions than many other behaviors important to the Church, which could be in ‡uenced through ordinary incentives.
Vermin trials'power to in ‡uence citizens'belief in the legitimacy of the Church's supernatural sanctions resided in their power to produce outcomes that evidenced those sanctions' validity. These trials had two possible outcomes: prosecuted vermin could ‡ee or die, ceasing to plague the plainti¤s'property, or they could remain on the plainti¤s'property, continuing to plague the plainti¤s.
Only trials that led to the …rst of these outcomes evidenced the validity of ecclesiastics' supernatural sanctions. Prosecuted vermin that ‡ed or died during or shortly after their trials did so under ecclesiastic conjurors'imprecations or those imprecations'threat. Thus ecclesiastics could claim credit for the pests'departure.
Trials that led to the second outcome evidenced the bogusness of the Church's supernatural sanctions. Prosecuted vermin that remained on plainti¤s' property did so despite ecclesiastic conjurors' imprecations. Thus they cast doubt on the validity of ecclesiastics' conjurations.
A crucial feature of trying vermin is that the court conducting such a trial can in ‡uence which of these two outcomes the trial yields. Rodents and insects are itinerant. A pack of rats that ravages some …elds is likely to depart those …elds when feeding prospects begin to look better elsewhere. A swarm of locusts may move on for similar reasons. Alternatively, the pests may be killed or driven away by predators, or ‡ee or die naturally for other unobserved reasons. Because of this, over even reasonably short periods of time, vermin under an ecclesiastic court's imprecations could "miraculously" cease to harass the persons they formerly plagued.
The probability that a vermin problem will remedy itself in one of these ways rises as the period of time in question lengthens. Thus, by protracting vermin's trial, an ecclesiastic court could improve the chances that the pests would depart under its imprecations or their threat.
Courts had a variety of means at their disposal for prolonging trials. Indeed, since courts determined which legal plays vermin trials consisted of and the amount of time convicted species had to comply with their judgments, ecclesiastics could ensure any trial durations they desired. For example, a court could minimize a trial's length by immediately judging the vermin guilty. Or it could prolong the trial in various degrees by appointing the vermin lawyers, entertaining more arguments from opposing legal counselors, ordering the vermin to answer summonses, surveying the plainti¤s'infested property, negotiating with the vermin through their lawyers, granting the vermin continuances, giving convicted pests time to comply with court directions or judgments, and so on.
A su¢ ciently long trial achieved through such tactics guarantees that vermin will depart under ecclesiastics'imprecations or their threat. In the limit, winter arrives, killing the pests.
The problem for courts is that the positive relationship between the amount of time that passes (and thus trial duration) and a vermin problem remedying itself is well understood.
Even ill-informed farmers recognize that insects and rodents must die or move on eventually.
A vermin trial long enough to coincide with vermin's departure for certain is therefore also a trial that does nothing to increase citizens'belief in ecclesiastics'supernatural sanctions.
More generally, the longer a vermin trial lasts, the less convincing evidence it supplies for the validity of the Church's power to imprecate if the vermin depart.
Conversely, the shorter a trial's duration, the more convincing evidence of the Church's power it provides if the vermin depart, and thus the greater the boost such an outcome gives to citizens'belief. The most convincing evidence, and thus greatest boost to belief, is produced by the shortest trial that "succeeds"-that in which the court immediately declares vermin guilty and the pests quickly depart. But the shorter a trial is, the less likely it is to produce this outcome and the more likely it is to produce the outcome ecclesiastics want to avoid: vermin's persistence.
Given this tradeo¤, how did ecclesiastics use vermin trials to bolster citizens'belief on average?
My theory of how they did so applies Kamenica and Gentzkow's (2011) theory of Bayesian persuasion. Kamenica and Gentzkow demonstrate how, by choosing how much information to reveal about the state of the world, one person can persuade another to take an action he would prefer over the action the target of his persuasion originally planned to take. This is true even though both persons are rational Bayesians and even though the target of persuasion knows the persuader makes his choice of how much information to reveal with the goal of manipulating the target's behavior for his own bene…t.
The key feature of Bayesian rationality that permits this result is that fact Bayes'rule restricts only the expectation of posterior beliefs. Bayes rationality requires that an individual's expected posterior belief equal his prior belief, but otherwise put no constraints on his posteriors'distribution. Thus, as long as a target of persuasion doesn't act linearly in his beliefs, a persuader can in ‡uence the target's behavior in his interest. The persuader does so by manipulating the target's distribution of posteriors, which he achieves by controlling the information he conveys to the target.
To understand how ecclesiastics leveraged this logic through vermin trials to convince citizens to pay more tithes, consider an ecclesiastic court and a risk-neutral, 15th-century Suppose Pierre's total tithable harvest has dollar value y > 0, which faces a tithe rate t 2 (0; 1). Pierre chooses how much of that value to declare to the tithe collectors, x y. y > 0 is the minimum tithable harvest value Pierre can get away with declaring. The vagaries of agricultural production preclude tithe collectors from observing y. But they have a lower-bound estimate of Pierre's tithable harvest value based on factors they can observe, such as the weather and Pierre's plot size.
The Church supernaturally sanctions tithe evaders by claiming to estrange them from God. It declares them sinners, excommunicates them, and/or anathematizes them. These sanctions are divine, so they always and "automatically"execute on evaders who repose any belief in them. The Church's imprecations threaten a (utility) penalty for evaders that scales with the extent of their sin, and thus the extent of their tithe evasion, (y x), where > 0.
Tithe collectors don't observe the extent of a citizen's evasion, but God does. Two observations help identify this trial's optimal duration. First, note that when 0 < t a trial of any duration whose outcome is "unsuccessful"-i.e., s = not-has the same e¤ect on Pierre's behavior. Any such trial, which reduces Pierre's posterior, leaves his belief too weak to induce tithe compliance: s < t . Since a trial duration that induces a lower posterior when an unsuccessful outcome is realized induces a higher posterior when a "successful" outcome is realized-i.e., s = depart-the optimal trial duration if 0 < t is one that drives Pierre's posterior to zero when s = not.
Second, note that Pierre's behavior is the same whether his posterior is just equal to t or is greater than this. Since a trial duration that induces a higher posterior when a successful outcome is realized is less likely to produce such an outcome, the optimal trial duration if 0 < t is one that increases Pierre's posterior to exactly t when s = depart.
These observations imply that the court's optimal trial duration is one that induces a binary distribution over Pierre's posteriors, generating s = 0 with some probability and s = t the rest of the time. To …nd these probabilities, simply recall that Bayes rationality requires Pierre's expected posterior to equal his prior. Where ( s ) denotes the probability of s = t we have:
Solving this equation for , the court's optimal trial duration is one that induces s = 0 with probability 1 0 t and induces s = t with probability 0 t .
From here it's easy to compute the court's optimal trial duration. Using Bayes'rule,
and the fact that
we have
Solving for :
With this equation we can use the values for s , , and 0 from above to …nd the court's optimal . Doing so yields the binary signal:
When 0 t the court conducts no trial and ecclesiastics collect tithe revenue from Pierre equal to ty. When 0 < t the court conducts a trial and ecclesiastics expect to collect tithe revenue from Pierre equal to 0 (y y)+ty. This is more than what they collect from Pierre without the trial, ty . Even though Pierre is a rational Bayesian, and even though he's aware that the court manipulates the length of vermin trials to manipulate his belief, the court is able to use vermin trials to improve Pierre's tithe compliance and thus ecclesiastics' tithe revenue.
This model delivers two predictions. First, when courts conduct vermin trials, they
> 0. Maximally informative trials reveal too much information to citizens. They permit no scope for producing false positives (depart j ! = 0). Protracted trials, on the other hand, which are less informative, permit scope for false positives and in doing so enable ecclesiastics to use vermin trials to manipulate citizens'belief. Thus, when ecclesiastics conduct vermin trials, we should observe protracted trials rather than trials in which ecclesiastics render guilty judgments immediately.
Second, when ecclesiastics conduct vermin trials, trial duration is increasing in 0 . This can be seen by inspecting the optimal above. When prior belief is low it's harder to convince citizens to pay their tithes. So ecclesiastics must conduct more informative trials, which are shorter ones. As prior beliefs get closer to the threshold that induces tithe compliance, more frequent and less compelling false positives become more valuable to ecclesiastics. Thus, when ecclesiastics conduct vermin trials, we should observe longer trials where citizens'prior belief in the validity of the Church's supernatural sanctions is stronger.
Evidence
The historical evidence permits me to examine the …rst of the foregoing predictions, though The results of my e¤orts to locate vermin trials geographically and in time must be interpreted with caution. There are many reasons, besides that suggested by my theory, why we might expect to …nd vermin trials focused in locations and times in which belief in the Church's supernatural power is weak that the evidence available is unable to rule out.
Further, as I describe below, the data I rely on to locate vermin trials in time and place are unavoidably crude. The evidence for my theory considered below is therefore far from de…nitive. It is, however, instructive, and to the extent that it produces patterns that are suggested by the argument developed above, consistent with my theory.
1. When ecclesiastics conduct vermin trials, they prolong them.
According to my theory, when ecclesiastics conduct vermin trials they conduct them with
> 0. Thus rather than observing trials wherein courts immediately convict insects and rodents following plainti¤s'request that they do so, we should observe protracted trials that end only after delay. The evidence on vermin-trial durations supports this prediction.
"Delays" in vermin trials "were frequent and long" (Hyde 1916 , p. 705). "The courts would . . . by every reason for delay, evade" concluding them (Jamieson 1988 , p. 51).
Consider the trial of some weevils prosecuted in 1587 for "depredations and . . . doing incalculable injury" to a community's vines (Evans 1906, p. 42) . Their trial lasted eight months. And it wasn't exceptional.
One court granted the pregnant members of a convicted species "free and safe-conduct and an additional respite of fourteen days" from predators when it ordered them to depart an a-icted area (Evans 1906 , pp. 112-13). Others gave pests six days to vacate the premises before imprecating them.
Courts granted vermin repeated continuances throughout their trials. Further, they "conducted [trials] with solemnity, and with a most solicitous attention to the …ne points of the judicial process such as was never a¤orded . . . to human prisoners brought before the courts" (Finkelstein 1981 , p. 64). As one court remarked, "The arguments o¤ered by the counsel for the defence against the proceedings instituted by the inhabitants as complainants are worthy of careful consideration and deserve to be examined soberly and maturely" (Evans 1906 , p. 105). Careful, sober, and mature deliberations were undoubtedly slow ones.
Courts' desire to prolong vermin trials explains the impressive fairness they displayed toward prosecuted pests-why they "treated [bugs and rodents] with the greatest respect" (Finkelstein 1981 , p. 65). Similarly, it explains why courts were so amenable to vermin defense attorneys'endless, and endlessly absurd, dilatory tactics.
For example, Chassenée argued that his rat clients couldn't attend their trial because the court's summons was too local. O¢ cials needed to pronounce it over a wider region for the rats to hear. Still, the rats didn't come. His second turn before the bench he argued that the rats were absent because some members of the species were old and feeble: they required more time. Again the rats didn't come. His third time before the bench he argued that his clients were absent because some cats prevented them from attending. The court countenanced each of these arguments.
No excuse for protracting a vermin trial seems to have been too specious to permit. Equally important, the Vaudois rejected clerics'power to excommunicate and anathematize. In doing so they denied the validity of ecclesiastics'supernatural sanctions explicitly.
As a Vaudois excommunicated in 1486 put it, "they had been taught that the censures of the church could harm no one and should be ignored" (Cameron 1984 , p. 81). Among them, "excommunication and anathema . . . were declared to be worthless" (Audisio 1999, p. 55).
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Most seriously, early modern ecclesiastics equated Vaudois with witches. This association "was justi…ed by theologians on the grounds that the Waldensians, though originally devoted to poverty and asceticism, had gradually become committed to witchcraft" (Russell 1972, p. 220) . Vaudois often held their meetings in secret and at night. Thus it was only reasonable to attribute the most outrageous and unfathomable behaviors to them: they participated in orgies, had sexual liaisons with demons, and engaged in all other manner of ludicrous licentiousness.
"By the …fteenth century, witchcraft had not only been …rmly de…ned as heresy but also identi…ed with . . . especially the Waldensians, whose name became almost a synonym for witchcraft" (Russell 1972, p. 243) . Indeed, in the Jura mountain region "The identi…cation was so …rmly …xed that vauderie came to be a synonym for the sabbat" (Russell 1972 , p. for my analysis is that the trials of such individuals correlates in an informative way with ecclesiastics'perceptions of heretical activity-activity that weakened belief in their spiritual authority. Since "Witchcraft thrived best . . . wherever and whenever . . . heresy ‡ourished,"we can be reasonably con…dent this is the case even if witch trials capture such activity only broadly and imprecisely (Russell 1972, p. 268) . Figure 1 depicts the geographic distribution of heretical activity and vermin trials described above. 16 The cross-hatched areas on this map re ‡ect approximate regions of known
Vaudois concentrations or concentrations of witch trials. The circles re ‡ect locations of ver- 13 On the Vaudois and their concentrations, see also, Tice (1829) and Beattie (1838). 14 With the exception of Apulia and Calabria, these areas had long histories as heretic enclaves. See, for instance, Audisio (1999, pp. 33, 61) . 15 Further, Catholics didn't monopolize witch trials. After the Reformation, Protestants, who also considered witchcraft heretical, got in on the act too. I'm unable to exclude observations for witch trials that may have been conducted by Protestants rather than Catholics. Swiss regions'predominantly Protestant or Catholic status changed over time and, even within areas that became dominated by Protestants, Catholics sometimes continued to operate and conduct witch trials. 16 It excludes one trial of rats in an unknown location in Spain. A handful of cases fall outside my region/time period: these include a late 17th-century case in Canada; an early 18th-century case in Denmark, an early 18th-century case in Brazil; an early 19th-century case in Denmark; and two cases in Croatia in the second half of the 19th century. For reasons similar to those discussed in my cross-sectional analysis above, my time-series analysis is also crude. I have imprecise dates for several vermin trials whose century is known but whose location within century is not. 17 Further, three cases included in my vermin trial 17 In these cases I have assigned the trials in question to either the …rst or second half of the century as follows: I assigned a 9th-century trial of serpents in France to the 851-900 period; a 14th-century trial of ‡ies in Germany to the 1301-1350 period; and 3 15th-century trials (caterpillars, worms, and beetles) in Switzerland and Germany to the 1451-1500 period. data fall outside the France-Italy-Swiss region my witch-trial data consider. 18 Nevertheless, Figure 2 displays a clear pattern. In periods with more witch trials, ecclesiastics conducted more vermin trials. Signi…cant witch-trial activity begins toward the end of the 14th century, followed in the 15th century by vermin-trial activity. Comparing the two trends suggests that vermin-trial activity in one 50-year period follows witch-trial activity in the previous 50-year period. This implies that vermin trials may be a "lagging indicator" of heresy. By the second half of the 17th century, both sorts of trials become exceptional.
In the second half of the 16th century the Vaudois merged with the Calvinist Reformers.
But they existed as a distinct group located predominantly in Piedmont until the end of the 17th century. It's therefore unsurprising that 5 of the 9 vermin trials we're aware of that ecclesiastics conducted in the 17th century occurred in Italy.
The close of the 17th century corresponds to the time when Vittorio Amedeo II, Duke of Savoy and Prince of Piedmont, o¢ cially granted the Vaudois the right to practice their religion. This decision, made in 1690, followed on the heels of Amedeo's attempt to rid his territories of Vaudois permanently. Predictably, the close of the 17th century also sees the virtual end of vermin trials.
To consider the relationship between heretical activity and vermin trials across regions and over time explicitly, I use OLS to estimate the following equation:
Vermin trials i;t = + W itch trials i;t + " i;t where Vermin trials and Witch trials measure the number of trials of each type in region i in period t. I consider all trials of both types occurring in France, Italy, and Switzerland for which I have data from 800 to 1800. I divide each country into three regions corresponding to the western, central, and eastern parts of France and Switzerland, and the northern, central, and southern parts of Italy, creating nine regions. 19 I divide the thousand-year period my data span into centuries, creating ten time periods that correspond to each century. In an e¤ort to account for unobserved factors that may have in ‡uenced vermin trial activity, I also try running this regression including comprehensive region and period …xed e¤ects. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of region and period …xed e¤ects.
Concluding Remarks
My analysis of vermin trials helps resolve the peculiar puzzle these trials pose: "nobody knows what they were for, and nobody has ever known" (Ewald 1995 (Ewald , p. 1925 ). We may not know why ecclesiastics conducted vermin trials for sure. But we have a good idea.
Ecclesiastics conducted vermin trials because they maximized their pro…t.
Tithe revenues were a central source of the early modern Catholic Church's income.
But tithe compliance was hard to enforce. The vagaries of agricultural output on which ecclesiastics assessed tithes precluded e¤ective external monitoring and detection for all but the most blatant attempts to avoid payment.
Faced with this di¢ culty, the Church sought a way to make tithe compliance selfenforcing. That way was supernatural sanction. Supernatural sanctions that imposed "moral costs" on tithe evaders by allegedly separating them from God were potentially strong motivators for tithe compliance. But those sanctions only worked if citizens reposed su¢ cient belief in them.
Vermin trials gave ecclesiastics a way to bolster citizens'belief in the supernatural sanctions supporting tithe compliance where heretics had weakened it. They did so by producing outcomes that supported those sanctions'validity. Vermin that ‡ed or died under the specter of excommunication or anathema evidenced ecclesiastics'power to spiritually sanction tithe evaders.
Insects' and rodents' frequent migration and precarious position vis-à-vis nature made them excellent targets of ecclesiastic trial and conjuration. The absurdity heaped on absurdity of those trials-granting rats continuances because cats held them up, creating elaborate contracts with weevils, putting up posters of courts'decisions for vermin to read, and many more-re ‡ected ecclesiastics courts'desire to protract vermin trials in an e¤ort to optimally produce false-positive outcomes. Similarly, the absurd punishment courts threatened vermin with-excommunication and anathema-re ‡ected ecclesiastics' desire to evidence the legitimacy of the same punishments they used to address tithe evasion.
My analysis of vermin trials suggests that one reason superstitions may persist is that some persons bene…t from them. Ecclesiastics constituted such a group in early modern Europe. This view, according to which superstitions are variables of conscious decision making, challenges the traditional view of superstitions that sees them as inexplicably lingering beliefs. The traditional view might characterize some superstitions correctly. But it manifestly mischaracterizes others. "Superstition producers"deliberately manufacture and manipulate these beliefs for private purposes. Some superstitions'persistence is the product of rational choice. 
